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Abstract
The degree of altruistic behavior among strangers is an evolutionary puzzle. A prominent
explanation is the evolutionary legacy hypothesis according to which an evolved reciprocity-
based psychology affects behavior even when reciprocity is impossible, i.e., altruistic behav-
ior in such instances is maladaptive. Empirical support for this explanation comes from labo-
ratory experiments showing that surveillance cues, e.g., photographs of watching eyes,
increase altruistic behavior. A competing interpretation for this evidence, however, is that
the cues signal the experimenter’s expectations and participants, aware of being monitored,
intentionally behave more altruistically to boost their reputation. Here we report the first
results from a field experiment on the topic in which participants are unaware they are being
monitored and reciprocity is precluded. The experiment investigates the impact of surveil-
lance cues on a textbook example of altruistic behavior—hand hygiene prior to treating a
‘patient’. We find no evidence surveillance cues affect hand hygiene, despite using different
measures of hand-hygiene quality and cues that have been previously shown to be effec-
tive. We argue that surveillance cues may have an effect only when participants have rea-
sons to believe they are actually monitored. Thus they cannot support claims altruistic
behavior between strangers is maladaptive.
Introduction
The degree of altruistic behavior among strangers in modern societies is a major evolutionary
puzzle [1,2]. A prominent explanation is the ‘evolutionary legacy hypothesis.’ It posits that the
human brain evolved in ancestral conditions that differed radically from those in modern
environments [3,4]. Although nowadays many encounters are with anonymous strangers, for
much of our evolutionary past, humans interacted repeatedly in small social groups where
one’s reputation was constantly at stake, leading to the evolution of cognitive mechanisms to
automatically identify reputation-building opportunities [5–7]. According to the evolutionary
legacy hypothesis, individuals may behave altruistically in anonymous one-shot interactions
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due to an uncontrolled, automatic reaction aimed to bolster one’s good reputation in anticipa-
tion of positive reciprocity, even when such opportunities do not exist; i.e., the observed altru-
istic behavior between anonymous strangers is maladaptative [8,9].
Empirical support for this hypothesis comes from laboratory experiments showing that rep-
utation-related surveillance cues such as displaying photographs of watching eyes promote
altruistic behavior, i.e., actions which benefit another individual at a personal cost [10–12].
Since the cues do not affect one’s reputation, participants are anonymous to each other and
direct reciprocity is precluded by design, the effect has been attributed to the automatic activa-
tion of one’s reciprocity-based psychology [8,9]. A problem with this interpretation, however,
is that participants are not anonymous to the experimenter who may be observing their
choices or can easily infer them from their earnings. A competing interpretation therefore is
that the increase in altruism is due to an ‘experimenter effect’ [13–15]: surveillance cues signal
the experimenter’s expectations to participants who intentionally react to the stimulus in a way
they believe would boost their reputation with him/her. In other words, even though direct
reciprocity between participants is precluded, indirect reciprocity concerns may still play a
role. In line with this interpretation, survey evidence shows the effect on altruistic behavior is
mediated by participants’ expectation of reward by “a third party who was monitoring them”
[16].
One way to eliminate the possibility of an experimenter effect is to conduct field experi-
ments such that individuals are unaware they are participating in a study. In order to provide
clear evidence that altruistic behavior is maladaptive, however, certain conditions need to be
satisfied such that alternative explanations are ruled out. In particular, it is critical that all
encounters in the experiment are anonymous, one-shot and reciprocity of any kind is pre-
cluded. It is also desirable that exposure to the cues is brief as habituation with the false stimu-
lus may attenuate the effect through intentional brain processes [7,12]. If surveillance cues are
found to increase altruistic behavior in such circumstances this would support the hypothesis
that altruistic behavior between anonymous strangers is maladaptive. If surveillance cues have
no effect, it would suggest that previous findings may have been due to an intentional decision
taken to bolster one’s reputation with the experimenter. Here, we present the first evidence
from such a field experiment.
We take advantage of a unique opportunity to study altruistic behavior in a setup which
meets all the aforementioned requirements. This distinguishes our experiment from previous
field studies in which surveillance cues were displayed in public spaces over an extended period
of time [17–25]. As we explain in the last section of our paper, these studies were designed to
address different research questions. As such, the positive effect of surveillance cues on altruis-
tic behavior in these studies suggests a potentially useful, low-cost, policy intervention, but it
cannot support the claim that altruistic behavior among strangers is maladaptive as many of
the aforementioned conditions are not satisfied and indirect reciprocity opportunities exist.
In our experiment we investigate how two distinct surveillance cues impact the quality of
hand hygiene by medical students before treating a ‘patient.’ Hand hygiene (HH) is a general
term used to describe the process of removing microorganisms with a disinfectant agent such
as alcohol, or soap and water [26]. Appropriate HH among healthcare workers is considered
by some to be the most effective measure to prevent healthcare-associated infections [27],
which are associated with 50,000 and 99,000 deaths each year in Europe and the USA, respec-
tively [28], and annual hospital costs between $28.4 to $33.8 billion USD [26]. It is estimated
that a one-percent improvement in the quality of hand hygiene could save approximately
$40,000 USD per year in a 200-bed hospital for a single type of infection [29]. That is, how one
washes his or her hands is critical. Accordingly, compliance with HH guidelines has been iden-
tified by the World Health Organization (WHO) as a first priority in health-care facilities [28].
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Appropriate HH prior to treating a patient is a textbook example of altruistic behavior.
According to WHO’s guidelines, when contact with a patient is not invasive—as is the case in
our experiment—a healthcare provider must follow a specific technique to thoroughly wash
his/her hands both before and after contact, for 40 to 60 seconds each time (when contact is
invasive, the duration should be between 120 to 300 seconds) [28]. HH prior to treating a
patient is not only costly, taking time and effort, but also it does not benefit the healthcare pro-
vider directly, only the patient whose chances of a healthcare associated infection are estimated
to decrease between 15 and 30% [30]. Both the cost to the practitioner [31] and the lack of indi-
vidual benefits [32] from HH prior to treating a patient have been cited as prime reasons for
why compliance with WHO’s guidelines is low. In support of the idea that HH prior to treating
a patient constitutes an altruistic act is the evidence that compliance with HH guidelines is
substantially higher after contract with the patient [31,33]. In the concluding section, we pres-
ent results from a survey showing that concerns for the welfare of the patient indeed appear to
be the primary reason for washing hands prior to treating a patient in our experiment.
The experiment
The experiment was conducted in a large university, which is well-regarded locally for its med-
ical program: the United Arab Emirates University (see section A in S1 Appendix). Partici-
pants were advanced undergraduate students in the Doctor of Medicine (MD) program who
had completed training modules in the basic principles of clinical practice, including infection
prevention and HH in accordance with WHO guidelines. For the experiment, we took advan-
tage of a unique opportunity offered by the program for students to privately practice their
clinical skills—a Practice Objective Structured Clinical Examination (POSCE). The official
OSCE is a critical part of all MD programs aimed to formally evaluate one’s clinical compe-
tence. Medical students in the OSCE are observed and evaluated by faculty members as they
go through a series of stations, interviewing, examining and treating different standardized
patients who present some type of medical problem. The POSCE was identical to the OSCE,
with two crucial differences: (i) faculty members were not present to observe or evaluate the
competence of the students, and (ii) participants remained anonymous throughout the pro-
cess. Students were fully aware that the purpose of the exercise was for them to practice their
skills without being judged or evaluated.
A note outside the ‘patient’s room’ informed students that their main task was to take the
blood pressure of a standardized patient (see section D in S1 Appendix). Medical students are
aware that, whenever they are having physical contact with a standardized patient, there is a
real risk of contaminating him/her. Participants therefore know that best clinical practice
requires they wash their hands carefully immediately prior to measuring the standardized
patient’s blood pressure, following the WHO’s HH guidelines. At the same time, participants
are not monitored and, like with the OSCE, each practice slot lasts ten minutes—this is signi-
fied by automated bells in the corridors, which were meant to reinforce the fact that the
POSCE was not monitored. During this time, they had to briefly interview the standardized
patient, wash their hands, measure blood pressure, wash their hands again, and provide feed-
back to the patient. Given their limited experience with the blood measurement instruments,
participants had an incentive to take advantage of this one-off opportunity and spend most of
their time practicing measuring blood pressure as it is likely to be relevant in the official
OSCE. Therefore, there is a non-trivial cost for participants from properly washing their
hands, but incurring the cost benefits the standardized patient. It should be noted that students
could not benefit patients by expediting HH as each POSCE slot lasted exactly ten minutes,
i.e., they could leave neither earlier nor later.
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The experimental treatments varied the surveillance cues which were displayed, approxi-
mately at eye-level, above a wash basin (see Fig 1, and section G in S1 Appendix) and under-
neath the standard HH poster by WHO explaining in detail appropriate HH (see section H in
S1 Appendix). Due to the HH guidelines and the limited time of the session, exposure to the
surveillance cue was necessarily brief (<60 seconds). Participants were randomly assigned to
treatments/cues (see section A in S1 Appendix). The Baseline condition, like previous studies,
consists of a non-reputation-related image—the picture of a tree. In the Eyes treatment, a pair
of stern-looking male eyes was displayed. This particular image was chosen as it has been pre-
viously associated with a large positive effect on HH, i.e., a 122% increase relative to a baseline
condition when the cue was placed in a public space over an extended time period [25]. This
was important as it was uncertain ex ante how large a sample we could hope to attract. Ulti-
mately, the turnout was substantial and higher than we had expected: 114 students out of an
eligible student population of 330. With this sample size, our tests have sufficient power to
detect treatment differences substantially smaller than those in King et al. [25] (see section C
in S1 Appendix). Note that in order to be exposed to the treatment manipulation, participants
had to go to the wash basin to wash their hands. Some participants in our sample had to be
prompted to do so by the standardized patient. Our results are unaffected if we exclude these
participants from the analysis (see section B in S1 Appendix).
The Camera treatment is the first of its kind in the literature. In this treatment, the picture
of a CCTV camera was placed over the wash basin. Such CCTV cameras are omnipresent in
the country of our study, although none was available in the examination room. If people have
developed cognitive mechanisms to automatically identify reputation-building opportunities
through millennia, and this is the cause for the changes in altruistic behavior when reputation-
related cues are presented, then we would expect to observe an effect in the Eyes but not in the
Camera treatment [8]. A difference in HH between our Camera and Baseline conditions could
be interpreted as evidence participants are concerned about actually being watched.
Apart from informing students they would need to measure blood pressure, the briefing
note outside the room explained that the only people inside the room will be two simulated
patients that will take turns being the ‘patient’. (Rooms were spacious: approx. 25 square
meters or 270 square feet, see section F in S1 Appendix.) This is standard practice as a person
should not have his/her blood pressure measured repeatedly. The simulated patients (RAs)
were trained to appear indifferent to the actions of the medical students. At any given point,
one RA waited for his/her blood pressure to be measured, and the other–seated at a faraway
corner of the room—waited for his turn, while filling out a Sudoku book. In actuality, this indi-
vidual was covertly monitoring the student’s HH practice (see sections E in S1 Appendix). All
RAs had been professionally trained on how to evaluate the quality of one’s HH. Crucially, the
simulated patients were selected such that they were completely unknown to the students
(with one exception, see section B in S1 Appendix).
Like in previous studies, direct reciprocity is prevented by design: not only were standard-
ized patients in a passive role, but they were also trained to appear bored and indifferent to the
POSCE. To preclude indirect reciprocity, encounters had to be anonymous such that reputa-
tional concerns could not affect altruistic behavior. For this reason, students and simulated
patients were explicitly instructed not to share their identities. As both ‘patients’ would remain
in the room at the end of the session to receive the next medical student, while the practicing
student would leave, it was clear to participants that encounters were one-shot and that there
would be no opportunities for the ‘patients’ to reciprocate, either directly or indirectly. Fur-
ther, to ensure observers were blind to our treatment manipulation, the RA who acted as the
patient changed the poster before the next participant entered the room so that the observer
was not aware which poster was displayed at any point in time.
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Fig 1. Picture of the wash basin in the private examination room featuring the watching eyes.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0197959.g001
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Results
Our measure of altruistic behavior is the quality of hand hygiene prior to treating the patient.
As mentioned, how a medical practitioner washes his/her hands is of critical importance for
minimizing the risk of an infection. The survey evidence presented in the concluding section
suggests that participants were well aware of this. In order to evaluate the quality of hand
hygiene amongst participants, we use three distinct measures from the WHO guidelines about
HH. First, we consider the time spent washing hands. Second, we study the quality of hand
coverage, i.e., the extent to which a participant washed all surfaces of his/her hands. Third, we
consider compliance with a rule prescribing participants use a tissue to switch off the tap, after
finishing washing their hands. For simplicity and brevity, we present the means of these vari-
ables in the figures below; the distributions of these variables can be found in section K in S1
Appendix.
Fig 2 shows that, across treatments, participants on average washed their hands for slightly
more than 20 seconds. While this may be more than the time spent by many adults washing
their hands, it falls considerably short of the minimum recommended duration stated by
Fig 2. Average time spent washing hands across treatments (with 95-percent confidence intervals).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0197959.g002
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WHO (40 seconds). This implies that there are good conditions for our treatments to increase
the quality of hand hygiene and, in this instance in particular, the time spent washing. How-
ever, we find no statistically significant differences across treatments (Eyes vs. Baseline:
P = 0.69, N = 71; Camera vs. Baseline: P = 0.64, N = 79; Mann-Whitney Test, two-tailed).
Fig 3 presents the average quality of hand coverage across treatments. As mentioned, the
RAs were professionally trained to evaluate the extent to which participants followed the
WHO guidelines and, in this instance, covered adequately all hand surfaces. Performance was
coded as 0 if the participant did not attempt to cover multiple surfaces (e.g., did a simple rub
of the palms against each other), as 1 if the participant covered multiple but not all surfaces
(e.g., did not wash thumbs), and 2 if the participant covered all surfaces. As can be seen in Fig
3, average coverage is very similar in Eyes and Baseline, and statistically indistinguishable
(P = 0.99, N = 71; Mann-Whitney Test, two-tailed). Although the quality of coverage is slightly
higher in the Camera treatment, the difference with Baseline is statistically insignificant
(P = 0.18, N = 79; Mann-Whitney Test, two-tailed).
Fig 3. Average quality of hand coverage across treatments (with 95-percent confidence intervals).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0197959.g003
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Fig 4 presents the extent to which participants across treatments turned off the tap after
washing their hands using a paper towel. This is critical in HH because a lot of bacteria can be
found on the water tap. Participants have therefore been trained that not using a towel reduces
considerably the efficacy of HH at combating disease transmission. Performance was coded as
0 if the participant did not use a paper towel at all, as 1 if the participant used a paper towel but
improperly (e.g., used paper towel but also touched tap with bare hands), and 2 if the partici-
pant used properly a paper towel. Average compliance with this rule is lower in Eyes than in
Baseline, although the difference is again statistically insignificant (P = 0.39, N = 71; Mann-
Whitney Test, two-tailed). Compliance is similar in Camera and Baseline and statistically
insignificant (P = 0.90, N = 79; Mann-Whitney Test, two-tailed). Neither the fraction of partic-
ipants using a paper towel properly differs significantly across treatments (Eyes: 17.1%, Cam-
era: 20.9%, Baseline: 16.7%; Eyes vs. Baseline: P = 1.00, N = 71; Camera vs. Baseline: P = 0.78,
N = 79; Fisher Exact Test, two-tailed) nor the fraction of participants not using a towel at all
(Eyes: 65.7%, Camera: 53.5%, Baseline: 52.7%; Eyes vs. Baseline: P = 0.37, N = 71; Camera vs.
Baseline: P = 1.00, N = 79; Fisher Exact Test, two-tailed).
Fig 4. Average compliance with turning-off-tap-with-paper-towel rule across treatments (with 95-percent confidence intervals).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0197959.g004
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Discussion
Our paper presents the first empirical test of the impact of surveillance cues on the altruistic
behavior of anonymous strangers when reciprocity is precluded and participants are unaware
they are being studied. These conditions are critical to obtain clear support for the evolution-
ary legacy hypothesis—a prominent explanation for altruistic behavior between strangers—
according to which costly altruistic behavior in anonymous encounters is an anomaly, owning
to our ancestral past and the development of automated, involuntary mechanisms for boosting
one’s good reputation. Despite using cues that have been successfully used previously in the lit-
erature, we find no evidence surveillance cues increase the degree of altruistic behavior in our
experiment. That is, our findings do not support the hypothesis that altruistic behavior among
strangers is maladaptive.
One concern with all studies reporting null results is that this is due to the statistical tests
being underpowered. This is clearly not the case in our experiment. Not only do we find no
evidence across three distinct measures that the picture of eyes has a significant impact on
altruistic behavior in our experiment, but the effect itself is sometimes zero (Fig 3) or negative
(Fig 4). By comparison, the effect of posting a picture of a camera over a wash basin—which as
we argued could not be considered as supportive of the evolutionary legacy hypothesis—is also
always insignificant and small in size, but at least it is always positive. Therefore, the overall
lack of a significant effect cannot be attributed to insufficient statistical power.
Another concern may be that the lack of a positive effect is due to the fact that our experi-
ment investigates the impact of surveillance cues on the quality of hand hygiene (intensive
margin) but not on the decision to wash hands (extensive margin). Indeed, early evidence
from dictator game experiments—in which an individual is assigned an amount of money and
must decide how much of it to share with a passive recipient—suggested that surveillance cues
may have a greater impact on the likelihood a ‘dictator’ shares a positive amount (extensive
margin) than on the actual amount they share (intensive margin); combining margins the
effect was often zero [11]. A recent meta-analysis of laboratory studies however contradicts
these earlier results, finding no differential effect of cues on the extensive and the intensive
margin [34]. Further, some field studies find the opposite result, i.e., that the impact of the
cues is stronger on the intensive margin [19] or that a positive effect on charitable donations is
obtained even when there are no differences in the proportion of donors responding to the
cues [13]. Therefore, there exist neither clear empirical evidence nor theoretical reasons to
expect the automatic activation of the reciprocity-based psychology will operate differently on
the decisions on the extensive and intensive margins.
Although our design precludes both direct and indirect reciprocity by ensuring encounters
are one-shot and all individuals involved (both participants and standardized patients) are
unknown and anonymous to each other, we cannot rule out the possibility that, despite our
efforts to avoid this, the presence of the standardized patients may have activated participants’
reciprocity-based psychology already in the Baseline treatment, making it difficult to identify a
treatment effect. However, it is worth emphasizing that similar concerns apply in laboratory
environments. In fact, they are arguably greater: not only there are several participants in the
lab at the same time–some of whom subjects may know personally—but their decisions are
recorded by a computer and possibly observed by the experimenter. Even if this is not the case,
participants—who often partake repeatedly in lab experiments—should anticipate that their
final payment will ultimately reveal the extent of their altruistic behavior to the experimenter.
If the reason for not observing a surveillance-cue effect in our experiment is the activation of
the reciprocity-based psychology already in the Baseline condition, then it follows that the lab
evidence on “watching eyes” cannot provide clear support either that altruistic behavior
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among strangers is maladaptive. It should also be noted that behavior across measures in our
experiment falls considerably short of that described in the WHO guidelines. If participants
were concerned about their reputation, one might have expected higher compliance with the
guidelines than observed.
An altogether different concern with our study could be that hand hygiene prior to treating
a patient is in fact not an altruistic act as we claimed. Although similar claims are common in
the medical literature [31,33], one might wonder whether hand hygiene is regarded as altruis-
tic, i.e., as conferring a benefit to the patient, in our particular context by medical students
such those participating in our experiment. To address this concern, we administered a survey
to 100 medical students with the same level of training and background as those who partici-
pated in our experiment (see section I in S1 Appendix). Respondents were presented with a
vignette designed to mimic the situation and incentives in our experiment, and asked whether
they would wash their hands prior to treating the patient or not, and the reasons for their deci-
sions. The survey also included a question to evaluate our claim that the quality of hand-
hygiene matters when it comes to reducing infection by asking participants whether they agree
that washing hands for longer reduces the risk of infection for the patient.
Of the survey respondents who stated they would wash their hands prior to taking the
blood pressure, 96.6% agreed with the statement that they would do so to avoid doing harm to
the patient. We can reject the hypothesis that respondents neither agree nor disagree with the
statement in favor of the alternative hypothesis that they agree with it (P<0.01, N = 87, Wil-
coxon signed rank, two tailed). This supports our interpretation of hand hygiene prior to treat-
ing a patient as being an altruistic act as it is driven by a concern for the welfare of the patient.
Participants were also more likely to agree with this reason for hand washing than with any of
the other reasons (P<0.01 for all pairwise comparisons, N = 87, Wilcoxon signed rank, two
tailed) indicating that the desire to do no harm to the patient is the main concern driving hand
hygiene prior to contact with the patient. Perhaps unsurprisingly, we find that other concerns
also appear to play a role (see sections I and J in S1 Appendix), implying that hand hygiene
prior to treatment is not driven exclusively by altruistic concerns for everyone. This, however,
does not invalidate our analysis which only requires that altruistic motives are an important
determinant of behavior in our experiment. We can also reject the hypothesis that respondents
neither agree nor disagree with this statement in favor of the alternative hypothesis that they
agree with it (P<0.01, N = 93, Wilcoxon signed rank, two tailed).
At first pass, our findings appear to contradict those in previous field studies finding a
strong positive effect of surveillance cues on altruistic behavior in natural environments [17–
25]. Such interpretation of our findings however would be wrong. A critical difference between
these studies and ours, stemming from the different research aims, is that the cues in these
studies were placed in public spaces such as university cafeterias [17,18], public car parks [20],
super markets [13,21] or hospital entrances [25], over an extended period of time. This implies
that real reputational concerns were at play. For example, participants in all these studies could
self-select into several treatments, more than once, suggesting that individuals may be aware of
the treatment manipulations and thus suspect they are being monitored. Similarly, since the
manipulations occurred in places frequented by the participants, many of the encounters were
likely to be neither anonymous nor one-shot, implying that reciprocity is not precluded by
design. For these reasons, these studies suggest a potentially useful, low-cost, policy interven-
tion (as was intended by the authors) but the evidence cannot inform the debate of whether
altruistic behavior between strangers is maladaptive.
Taken together, the field evidence suggests that surveillance cues may be effective in pro-
moting altruistic behavior in circumstances in which there are real opportunities to build a
good reputation. In these instances, the cues may serve as a signal of what the expected
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behavior is and that behavior is monitored. In line with this is the finding that the surveil-
lance-cue effect appears to be strongest when peer effects are modest [13,18], possibly due to
the increased difficulty of monitoring behavior in large groups. Additional studies can help
explore the underlying mechanism through which surveillance cues operate. Our findings
indicate that surveillance-cues effects should not readily be interpreted as evidence that altruis-
tic behavior between strangers is maladaptive.
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